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FOREWORD
DOES THE SUPREME COURT STILL
MATTER?
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY B. DYK∗
Late last year, Time Magazine’s cover featured a picture of Chief
Justice Roberts with the headline: “Does the Supreme Court Still
1
Matter?” The general answer is: of course. This is particularly and
increasingly evident in our own, previously obscure, field of patent
law. However, this development has not been entirely welcome to the
patent bar. At any gathering of the bar, no tag line of a speech has
more assurance of applause than one that importunes the Supreme
Court to keep its hands off the patent law. This concern is not new.
Our predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
sometimes viewed Supreme Court review as inimical because of the
risk that the Supreme Court would misunderstand and misapply
2
patent doctrine.
Hostility to Supreme Court review is, in my view, misguided.
Among other things, Supreme Court review is essential to prevent
patent law from ossification and to ensure that appropriate policy
considerations play a role in the development of the law. Like it or
not, however, the Supreme Court’s role in this area will continue,
and the bar must heed the Greek proverb—to accept that which we

∗ Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The
author is grateful to his current clerk, Dennis J. Abdelnour, and his former clerk,
Jessica R. Hauser, for their excellent research assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
1. David Von Drehle, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, TIME, Oct. 22, 2007, at
Cover.
2. See, e.g., Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 966 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff’d, 447
U.S. 303 (1980) (referring to the unintended negative effect in patent law resulting
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).
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3

cannot change. I will begin by explaining why I think the Supreme
Court will stay at the party long after some of the guests might have
wished it gone, and then discuss what the Supreme Court is likely to
contribute to the festivities.
I
4

My colleagues in recent forewords, along with various other
5
scholars have noted the Supreme Court’s recent increased interest in
patent cases. Since the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the
Supreme Court has agreed to hear twenty patent or patent-related
6
cases coming from our court. In the first ten years, the Supreme
Court only reviewed three Federal Circuit patent decisions, and one
7
of those was decided summarily without oral argument. In our
court’s second decade, the pace increased a bit, with the Supreme
Court’s agreeing to hear nine cases—still an average of less than one
8
case a year. That pace, however, has substantially accelerated in the
past five years and particularly in the last three, in which the Supreme
3. See EPICTETUS, ENCHIRIDION, reprinted in GREAT TRADITIONS IN ETHICS 74
(Theodore C. Denise et al. eds., 1996) (“There are things which are within our
power, and there are things which are beyond our power.”).
4. Honorable Arthur J. Gajarsa & Dr. Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Foreword: The
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 821 (2006); Honorable Jay S.
Plager, Foreword: The Price of Popularity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2007,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 751 (2007).
5. E.g., John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the
Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 278 (2002).
6. I do not include in the total so-called grant, vacate, and remand (“GVR”)
cases, where the Supreme Court granted certiorari to remand in light of another
decision, or the Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989),
decision addressing issues of preemption in a case coming from the Florida Supreme
Court.
7. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 661–62 (1990)
(interpreting the pharmaceutical safe harbor under the Patent Act); Christianson v.
Colt Indus., 486 U.S. 800, 801 (1988) (applying the “well-pleaded complaint” rule to
determine the scope of Federal Circuit jurisdiction); Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit
Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (per curiam) (summarily vacating and remanding
with instructions for the Federal Circuit to reconsider its decision in light of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)).
8. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826
(2002) (Federal Circuit jurisdiction over patent law counterclaims); Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (doctrine of
equivalents); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124
(2001) (patentable subject matter of plant breeds); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (state sovereign immunity
involving patent suits); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (the applicability of
the Administrative Procedure Act to decisions of the Patent and Trademark Office);
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (on-sale bar); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (doctrine of equivalents); Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (patent claim construction);
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993) (mootness of invalidity
cross-appeals).
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Court has granted certiorari in eight cases (one of which was later
9
dismissed as improvidently granted). Eight cases would represent
about 3.4% of all cases decided by the Supreme Court in the last
10
three terms. Last term, the Supreme Court decided sixty-seven cases
after argument, of which three were patent cases, or 4.5%. The
Court’s interest in patent cases is even more significant when we
consider that all of the courts of appeals together decide
11
approximately 35,000 cases per year. The chance that the Supreme
Court would hear an individual case is therefore negligible. Our
court in 2006 decided 276 patent cases, both precedential and non12
precedential, so the Supreme Court hears as much as 1% of the
patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit.
II
Numbers alone, however, do not begin to capture the importance
of the Supreme Court’s present and future role in the development
of the patent law. I suggest that there are several reasons why the role
of the Supreme Court in the future is likely to be pivotal.
The first reason for continued Supreme Court interest lies in the
importance of intellectual property, particularly patents, to the
9. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007) (granting
certiorari in a case involving implied licenses); Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127
S. Ct. 1746, 1747 (2007) (extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law); KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (2007) (obviousness); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 764 (2007) (scope of declaratory judgment
jurisdiction); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921,
2921 (2006) (dismissing as improvidently granted); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 388 (2006) (test for injunctive relief in patent cases); Ill. Tool
Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 28 (2006) (relationship between patent
tying and market power); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193,
193 (2005) (statutory drug-research safe harbor).
10. The Supreme Court issued 210 opinions (not including GVRs) in the last
three terms combined, with sixty-seven opinions in the 2006 term, sixty-nine
opinions in the 2005 term, and seventy-four opinions in the 2004 term. JOHN G.
ROBERTS, 2005 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7 (2006), http://www.sup
remecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2005year-endreport.pdf; JOHN G. ROBERTS,
2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 (2007), http://www.supremecour
tus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf; JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2007 YEAREND REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 9 (2008), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/pu
blicinfo/year-end/2007year-endreport.pdf.
11. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Appeals Terminated on the Merits After Oral
Hearings or Submission on Briefs During the 12-Month Period Ending September
30, 2006, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/tables/s1.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2008) (indicating that the U.S. courts of appeals heard a total of 34,580 cases during
2006).
12. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; Appeals Filed and
Terminated, by Category, FY 2006, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/TableAppealsF
iledTerminated06.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2008). The court adjudicated 259 cases
originating in the district courts and seventeen cases originating in the Patent and
Trademark Office. Id.
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American economy. It has been estimated that thirty years ago
intellectual property represented only 20% of the value of American
corporate enterprises, with 80% represented by hard assets. Today
the proportions are the reverse, with 80% of value now attributable to
13
intellectual property. As the American manufacturing sector has
declined, American economic leadership in the global market is now
in the area of intellectual property. Appropriate protection for that
property has thus become a central issue.
The second reason is that the scope of that protection has largely
been left to the courts to define. The Constitution confers, in very
general language, authority on the Congress “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
14
and Discoveries.” Since the very beginning of our nation, Congress
has provided a system for the granting of patents. However, up to
now, the implementing legislation has not been a great deal more
specific than the Constitution itself, with rare exceptions, such as the
15
To borrow a phrase Judge Rich used so
Hatch-Waxman Act.
famously in another context, the patent statutes provide few blaze
16
marks to mark the trail.
This landscape is a familiar one to practitioners of administrative
law. In the modern era, Congress has frequently legislated in general
terms because it simply lacks either the ability or the inclination to
provide detailed guidance. In most areas, the solution lies in the
familiar Chevron doctrine, under which administrative agencies
receive rulemaking authority and are charged with the task of
17
defining statutory requirements with greater specificity. The courts,
in turn, are to defer to agencies if the statutory language is
18
ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.
The
agencies are seen as more qualified than the courts to fill the gaps
19
and to determine appropriate policy.

13. See Ocean Tomo 300® Patent Index, http://www.oceantomo.com/index_ot3
00.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (“[I]n 1975 more than eighty percent of
corporate value reflected in the S&P® 500 was tangible assets, while intangible assets
comprised less than twenty percent of market capitalization. Today, the ratio of
tangible to intangible assets has inverted—nearly eighty percent of corporate value
resides in intangible assets.”).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
16. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 994–95 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
17. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837–38
(1984).
18. Id. at 843–44.
19. See id. at 865–66.
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The solution in the patent area is quite different. Unlike the
situation with many federal administrative agencies, the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has no substantive rulemaking
authority, at least under our decisions, and accordingly we have
afforded no Chevron deference to its interpretation of the substantive
20
provisions of the patent statute. Moreover, Congress has not so far
created a significant role for the PTO in the infringement litigation
process, either with respect to issues of claim construction, validity, or
enforceability, though the reexamination process is perhaps
becoming increasingly significant as an adjunct to litigation. This is
not to suggest that the PTO does not play a critical role in the patent
system. However, the courts, rather than the PTO, have the
responsibility under the statute with developing the substantive law of
patents—a kind of common law of patents—much as in the area of
21
antitrust. In this environment, Supreme Court review is even more
important than in areas where the statutes are more detailed or
Chevron applies and the courts have a less central role.
This situation appears likely to continue. Congress is presently
22
considering significant patent legislation.
However, even if that
legislation passes, it would make changes in only a few areas, and,
even then, would leave to the courts the obligation to flesh out the
meaning of the general language. In fact, if Congress does act, it will
likely result in even more Supreme Court patent cases because the
Court has historically acted to provide guidance as to the meaning of
23
new patent legislation. In other words, whether Congress enacts
new patent legislation or not, the Supreme Court will have a
significant role to play.

20. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining
that the PTO does not have the rulemaking authority associated with certain
regulatory agencies).
21. See generally Rhone Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 284 F.3d
1323, 1327 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[I]n the area of patent law, as in the area of
antitrust, ‘the [Erie] doctrine . . . is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision
within which the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes
that legal relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having
its source in those statutes, rather than by local law.’”) (citing Sola Elec. Co. v.
Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176, (1942)).
22. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed by
House of Representatives and placed on Senate Calendar), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR01908:@@@D&summ2=m&.
23. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (addressing what effect
the 1952 Patent Act had upon the traditional statutory and judicial tests of
patentability with respect to obviousness); see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp.,
127 S. Ct. 1746, 1747 (2007); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S.
193 (2005); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001);
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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Supreme Court participation is also crucial because it is the only
appellate court, other than our own court, with a significant role to
play in the development of the patent law. In 1982, Congress created
the Federal Circuit and placed responsibility for the development of
24
Because of the Federal
the patent law primarily in our court.
Circuit’s near-exclusive jurisdiction, the other circuits have little to
contribute. Under Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
25
Systems, Inc., which held that the assertion of patent counterclaims
does not create § 1338 jurisdiction, there is a sliver of jurisdiction in
the other circuits, and at least one member of the Supreme Court has
expressed hope that other courts will become involved in the
26
development of patent law. However, it seems unlikely for several
reasons. The exception that Vornado created is a narrow one,
applying only when a party first raises the patent issue in a
27
counterclaim. The power of the plaintiff to frame the original case
as one for the Federal Circuit probably means that few cases will be
filed in the jurisdiction of the regional courts. And, even if a case is
heard by another circuit, the other circuits may in any event be
bound to apply Federal Circuit law. Moreover, now that we are
celebrating our twenty-fifth anniversary, the pre-1982 law from the
other circuits is rarely relevant. To be sure, the assignment of patent
law to a single circuit, and the avoidance of inter-circuit conflicts,
makes it unnecessary for the Supreme Court to resolve circuit
conflicts. However, the lack of conflict means that the law is less
likely to develop in new directions without Supreme Court review.
Supreme Court review is also essential because much of the Court’s
existing patent jurisprudence is old, out of date and difficult to apply
to modern conditions, or even, in some instances, somewhat
confusing. At the same time, the stare decisis effect of both Supreme
Court decisions and our court’s own decisions significantly constrains
panels of our court from changing existing doctrine. In other words,
except to the extent that we consider cases en banc, only the
Supreme Court can change existing law. The Supreme Court
necessarily plays a critical role in reinterpreting, or even overruling,
earlier Supreme Court decisions and in altering our jurisprudence to
keep up with the demands of a changing world.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
25. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
26. See id. at 839 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“An occasional conflict in decisions
may be useful in identifying questions that merit this Court’s attention. Moreover,
occasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to
the risk that the specialized court may develop an institutional bias.”).
27. Id. at 831–32 (majority opinion).
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Continued Supreme Court review is also likely because the current
Court has barely begun to address the substantive law of patents.
Despite the number of patent cases decided by the Court in the past
few years, in the twenty-five years of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme
Court has only rarely granted review to consider what some might call
the substantive common law of patents. Of the twenty granted cases,
seven have involved procedural or jurisdictional issues—the standard
28
for review of the PTO in Dickinson v. Zurko, the scope of declaratory
29
judgment jurisdiction in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the
30
standard for injunctive relief in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the
31
scope of our appellate jurisdiction in Vornado and Christianson v. Colt
32
Industries Operating Corp., Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil
33
Procedure in Dennison Manufacturing Co. v. Panduit Corp., and
34
mootness in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc. One
35
addressed antitrust (Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. )
and another addressed the Eleventh Amendment (Florida Prepaid
36
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank). The
Supreme Court’s role in these cases has often been to bring patentrelated jurisprudence into conformity with rules applicable in other
37
areas.
Four of the cases involved the interpretation of specific
federal legislation: relating to FDA approval of drugs in Eli Lilly &
38
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. and medical devices in Merck KGaA v. Integra
39
Lifesciences I, Ltd., relating to the Plant Variety Protection Act in
40
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, and relating to § 271(f)
concerning infringement liability for acts directed to foreign
41
countries in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T.
Only seven times in twenty-five years has the Court agreed to
consider basic common-law substantive patent law issues: in Pfaff v.
42
Wells Electronics, Inc. concerning the on-sale bar, in Markman v.
28. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
29. 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
30. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
31. 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
32. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
33. 475 U.S. 809 (1986).
34. 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
35. 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
36. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
37. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 150–51 (1999) (applying the
standards associated with the Administrative Procedure Act to the review of Patent
and Trademark Office decisions).
38. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
39. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
40. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
41. 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
42. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
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43

Westview Instruments, Inc. concerning claim construction, in Warner44
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
45
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. concerning the doctrine of equivalents,
46
in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.
concerning patentable subject matter, and, more recently in KSR
47
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. concerning obviousness and in
48
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. concerning implied
licenses. In the last quarter century, there are many important issues
that the Court has not addressed.
Finally, the Supreme Court bar has turned its attention to patent
cases, and the patent bar itself has become increasingly sophisticated
about the potential for Supreme Court review in these cases. This
dynamic has increased the ability of the bar to present patent cases to
the Supreme Court in a way that increases the likelihood of a grant of
certiorari.
III
If, then, the Supreme Court will continue to play a major role in
the development of the patent law, what will be the characteristics of
the Supreme Court’s approach?
First, where Congress has spoken, the Court will defer to the
congressional judgment. In the area of intellectual property, there
will be little room to invalidate congressional legislation on
49
constitutional grounds. At the same time, as I suggested earlier, the
Court will continue to recognize that Congress has largely decided to
leave the development of the patent law to the courts. If major
legislative change occurs, the Court is likely to consider itself
obligated to interpret the terms of the statute.
Second, unlike some areas of the law, and in contrast to the
Supreme Court of the 1930s and 1940s, there does not seem to be,
and there is unlikely to be, a great philosophical division within the
50
Court as to the direction that patent law should take.

43. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
44. 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
45. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
46. 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006).
47. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
48. 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007).
49. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 186 (2003).
50. See Timothy B. Dyk, The Graver Tank Litigation in the Supreme Court, 30 J. SUP.
CT. HIST. 271, 280 (2005) (indicating that some of the institutional problems
associated with the Supreme Court during the Graver Tank decision are absent from
today’s Court).
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Third, if recent experience is any guide, I think we can anticipate
change from the Supreme Court whether the issues are substantive or
procedural. Whether in rejecting our doctrinal approach, or
approving new doctrine developed by our court, change has been the
hallmark of virtually every case that the Supreme Court has heard
involving longstanding doctrine. The effect has been to expand the
scope of obviousness in KSR, to restrict the scope of the doctrine of
equivalents in Hilton Davis and Festo, to create greater opportunity to
raise issues of invalidity by declaratory judgment in MedImmune, to
require adjudication of invalidity counterclaims on appeal in Cardinal
Chemical, and to restore the application of recognized equitable
standards in the injunction context in eBay. In Illinois Tool, as I noted
above, the Supreme Court revised the law of patent antitrust tying.
Change is the result of the Court’s greater willingness to perform
the central function of a common-law court—to reexamine doctrine
in the light of changed circumstances and to make the law better
serve the interest of all concerned. The fact that the mandate here is
statutory should not alter this basic responsibility. In the somewhat
similar area of antitrust, the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts beginning in the 1970s felt quite free to change antitrust law
51
without specific congressional authorization. Illinois Tool, in which
the Court revised the law of tying, is an example in the patent area of
52
the Court’s willingness to reexamine established antitrust law. In
patent law, as in antitrust law, the Supreme Court recognizes its
responsibility to make the law respond to modern conditions,
particularly in view of the importance of patent law to the American
economy.
Fourth, the Solicitor General will continue to play an important
role in the process. The Supreme Court routinely requests the views
of the Solicitor General in determining whether to grant certiorari in
patent cases, and carefully considers those views when it reaches the
53
merits. Although the PTO has no role in developing the substantive
law through rulemaking or adjudication, it does have a role to play

51. See, e.g., 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 305c
(2d ed. 2000) (discussing the stare decisis treatment of antitrust per se rules);
William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms,
71 Antitrust L.J. 377, 398–99 (2003).
52. Illinois Tool, 547 U.S. at 28.
53. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit:
Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 29 (2007),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol106/eisenberg.pdf (noting
that “the Supreme Court has increasingly sought and sometimes heeded the views of
the Solicitor General before granting certiorari in patent cases”).
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54

To be sure, our
through the office of the Solicitor General.
predecessor court was less than thrilled with the Solicitor General’s
55
role. In In re Bergy, the court directly criticized the Solicitor
56
General’s role in the Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Flook,
stating that, because of “misrepresentations” of the Solicitor General,
the Supreme Court had become “confused” due to “an unfortunate
and apparently unconscious, though clear, commingling of distinct
57
Today, the Solicitor General is generally
statutory provisions.”
viewed as having a more positive influence.
Fifth, the Supreme Court will likely continue to rely on our court
in reaching its decisions and to recognize that our court plays an
important role in interpreting and applying the Court’s ultimate
decisions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the
Federal Circuit has useful expertise in patent law, and that the
58
Frequently, the
Supreme Court benefits from having its views.
Supreme Court in patent cases articulates a general principle and
leaves it to our court to both administer the rule and apply it to the
59
individual case. One may anticipate that this will likely continue.
Sixth, the Supreme Court is a policy-oriented court. In all areas of
the law, it is interested in the purpose and policy behind the rules
that it interprets or articulates. The Court wants to know the reasons
for the rule, why this situation is the same as or different from other
facially similar situations, the appropriate stopping place for the
proposed rule, and the adverse consequences that will flow from
adopting or rejecting a particular approach. In other words, the
Supreme Court requires a different approach than has characterized
patent litigation historically, and litigants can only ignore this at their
own peril. The problem, in general, is that the academy goes too far
in urging a reshaping of the patent law to respond to perceived
policy, while the bar does not go far enough. This leaves the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts with little assistance in
sorting out the relevant policy concerns.

54. See id. (noting that the Solicitor General utilizes the input of the PTO).
55. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
56. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
57. Bergy, 596 F.2d at 959.
58. E.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1743 (2007); Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab. Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2926 (2006); WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997); Dennison Mfg. Co.
v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809, 811 (1986) (per curiam).
59. E.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006); Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 742 (2002); WarnerJenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
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Finally, the influence of the Supreme Court is reflected not only in
its specific decisions, but also in its communication of the approach
the courts should adopt. There is a penumbra to the Court’s
decisions. The Supreme Court will continue to define for our court,
in particular, the lens through which we should view the patent law,
including the extent to which existing doctrine should be judicially
reexamined (without congressional action), the extent to which
reliance interests should be protected, the role of the PTO in the
process, the balance to be struck between strong patent protection to
encourage innovation, and the interest in fostering the development
of competing technologies. I think it is not an overstatement to
predict that the Supreme Court’s role will be even greater in its
impact on the general approach to patent law than in its impact on
specific decisions by the lower federal courts.

